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Abstract: Where a party to an English arbitration clause commences proceedings before the courts 
of a state member of the EU other than the United Kingdom, the counterparty can: either claim for the 
stay of the proceedings before that Court, or start arbitral proceedings in England in order to obtain a 
declaratory ruling on the validity of the agreement which could subsequently be converted into a judg-
ment under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In accordance with Article 45(1)(c) of Brussels I Bis 
Regulation, this judgment entered in the terms of the award would entitle the complying party to resist 
within the United Kingdom the enforcement of a later inconsistent Regulation judgment rendered in 
another state member.
Keywords: declaratory awards, oorpedo actions, s.66 Arbitration Act 1996, Article 45(1)(c) Brus-
sels I Bis Regulation, enforcement of arbitral awards.
Resumen: Cuando la parte de un convenio arbitral sometido a Derecho Inglés comienza pro-
cedimientos judiciales ante los tribunales de un estado miembro de la UE diferente del Reino Unido, 
la contraparte puede: plantear una declinatoria internacional o iniciar el procedimiento arbitral con la 
intención de obtener un laudo declarativo concerniente a la validez del convenio que posteriormente 
podrá ser convertido en sentencia a través de la sección 66 de la Arbitration Act 1996. De acuerdo con 
el Artículo 45(1)(c) del Reglamento Bruselas I Bis, esta sentencia habilitaría a la parte que ha cumplido 
el convenio a oponerse al reconocimiento y ejecución de la sentencia contradictoria que pudiera dictarse 
posteriormente por el tribunal de otro estado miembro.
Palabras clave: laudos declarativos, acciones torpedo, s.66 Arbitration Act 1996, Art.45(1)(c) del 
Reglamento Bruselas Bis I, ejecución del laudo arbitral.
Summary: I. Introduction. II. Enforcement of the arbitral award under s.66 AA96: 1. Intro-
duction; 2. Scope of application: the award; 3. Enforcement under s.66(1) AA96; 4. Enforcement 
under s.66(2) AA96; 5. Defences and the right to raise an objection. III. Use of s.66 AA96 against 
Torpedo Actions: 1. A shield against a Torpedo Action; 2. Enforcement of declaratory awards under 
English Law; 3. Discretion to enforce the declaratory award; 4. Judgment shield vs Regulation Jud-
gment. IV. Conclusions.
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I. Introduction
1. The object of arbitration1 is the obtention of the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial 
tribunal2 occasionally assisted by Courts3. Contrary to what it ordinary occurs with Courts, the jurisdic-
tion of arbitral tribunals is not based upon a statutory provision, but on the existence of an agreement 
according to which the parties, not only decide to grant jurisdictional powers to the arbitrators but also 
to waive their right to litigate the disputes between them.
2. Thus, as it is well-known, the arbitration agreement is said to have a twofold effect: on one 
hand, it empowers the tribunal to resolve the disputes with a binding decision (the positive effect); and, 
on the other, it deprives the parties to the agreement of their right to bring in the disputes before a court 
(negative effect).
3. Under English Law, the negative effect of the arbitration agreement is protected by two legal 
instruments regarded as “opposed and complementary sides of a coin”4: the stay of the proceedings5 and 
the anti-suit injunctions.
4. Anti-suit injunctions are orders not addressed to a court, but to the person over whom they 
have “jurisdiction from continuing with or commencing proceedings in a foreign court if is inequitable 
1  Since the definition of Arbitration posed difficulties, the lawmakers opted for setting out the object of arbitration [‘De-
partmental Advisory Committee Report on Arbitration Law 1996’ para 18]. Apart from fairness and impartiality, s.1(a) AA96 
establishes as object of arbitration the avoidance of unnecessary delay or expense. These all were regarded by the DAC Report 
as aspects of justice or requirements of an heterocompositive dispute resolution system.
2  Amongst the general duties of the tribunal, s.33(1)(a) AA96 remarks that it must “act fairly and impartially as between the 
parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent”. The existence of 
circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the want of impartiality enables any party to apply to the court to remove 
the partial arbitrator or arbitrators [s.24(1)(a) AA96]. Unlike Art.12 Model Law, the Act does not provide for a full disclosure 
by the arbitrator of any circumstance which might give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartially or independence. Besides, 
the Act does not enlist potential bias which would make the arbitrator resign or get removed either. Therefore, the existence of 
a potential ground for reasonable suspicion regarding the lack of impartiality or independence of the arbitrator is not something 
which can be deemed as objective; but, on the contrary, it must be proved by the claimant. 
Regarding the disclosure of potential conflicts of interests in international commercial arbitration and investment arbitra-
tion, the International Bar Association has developed a traffic light system intended to assist parties, practitioners, arbitrators, 
institutions and courts. [Introduction International Bar Association, ‘IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration’ paras 5–6]. In summary, the guidelines distinguish red [List 1 and 2 – Part II], orange [List 3 – Part II] and green 
situations [List 4 – Part II]. The first ones indicate matters which must always be disclosed [Part II – Para. 3]; the second reflect 
situations which should be disclosed by arbitrators [Part II – Para. 3]; and finally, the green are situations where there is no 
conflict of interest and consequently arbitrators have no duty to disclose [Part II – Para. 7]. Though these guidelines are not legal 
provisions and do not override any applicable national law or arbitrable rules chosen by the parties, they are gaining greater 
recognition internationally [r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4th edn, Informa Law 2008) p. 88.], having 
been referred in ASM Shipping Co Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm) and in A & Others v B & 
X [2011] EWHC 2345 (Comm).
3  The principle of minimal court interference enshrined in s.1(c) AA96 intends to implement in English Law the approach 
according to which the courts generally only intervene in order to support the arbitral process, not take it over. (See ‘De-
partmental Advisory…’ op. cit. para 22). Apart from the enforcement of the award, under the Arbitration Act 1996, the main 
interventions of Courts during the arbitral proceedings are: Extension of the time the parties might have agreed to begin the 
proceedings (s.12 AA96); Determining how the limitation period must be computed in cases that the award has been set aside or 
declared to be of no effect. (s.13 AA96); Appointment of arbitrators (s.17 and 18 AA96); Removal of arbitrators; (s.24 AA96); 
Protection of the arbitration agreement through Anti-Suit Injunctions; Urgent preservation of evidences or assets (s.44(3) 
AA96); Determination of a preliminary point of jurisdiction (s.32 AA96); Enforcement of peremptory orders (s.42 AA96); 
Securing the attendance of witnesses (s.43 AA96); List of Court powers exercisable if support of arbitral proceedings (s.44 
AA96); Challenge the award on the ground of lack of substantive jurisdiction (s.67 AA96); Challenge the award on the ground 
of serious irregularities which have caused substantial injustice (s.68 AA96); and the challenge on a point of law (s.69 AA96).
4  Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35 [60]. See 
also paragraphs [21] – [28] of the same case.
5  s.9 AA96. As to the stay in international disputes see: a.L. CaLvo CaravaCa/ J. CarrasCosa GonzáLez/C. CaaMiña 
DoMinGuez, Litigación Internacional En La Unión Europea. I, Competencia Judicial y Validez de Resoluciones En Materia 
Civil y Mercantil En La Unión Europea: Comentario al Reglamento Bruselas I Bis (1st edn, Aranzadi 2017) 507–510.
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for such person so to act”6. This procedural device is used in most common law countries and its exist-
ence can be traced back to the fifteenth-century conflicts of jurisdiction between the Courts of Equity 
and the Courts of Common Law7. Nowadays granted under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 19818, 
for their adoption, the Claimant is required to demonstrate:
a)  That there is a valid arbitration agreement.
b)   That the claim brought in before the foreign court is made by a party to the arbitration agree-
ment and that the claim falls within the scope of the agreement9.
c)  That the application is made without delay10.
d)  That the claimant has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court11.
e)  That it is convenient to make the order.
5. Either anti-suit injunctions granted to protect a jurisdiction agreement, or the ones granted 
to protect the arbitration agreement are held to be against the European Regulation12. In consequence, 
English Courts cannot grant them in relation to disputes which fall within the scope of the European 
Regulation13. Thus, where a party to an English arbitration clause commences proceedings on civil and 
commercial matters before the courts of another state member, the options of the counterparty to protect 
the negative effect of the agreement seem to be restricted to the stay. However, as it is to be examined 
in this project, there could be an alternative option for the complying party based upon the combination 
of the arbitration agreement, the Arbitration Act 1996 and the Brussels I Bis Regulation14. As it will be 
demonstrated, a declaratory award ruling on the validity of the arbitration agreement can subsequently 
be converted in a judgment under section 66 of the Arbitration Act and thus become a judgment which 
6  Halsbury’s Laws of England 524.
7  C. oJieGbe, ‘From West Tankers to Gazprom: Anti-Suit Injunctions, Arbitral Anti-Suit Orders and the Brussels I Recast’ 
(2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 267, 271; a.L. CaLvo CaravaCa, J. CarrasCosa GonzáLez & C. CaaMiña 
DoMinGuez, Litigación Internacional… op. cit. p. 176.
8  Historically, it was doubtful whether they had to be granted under s.37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 or under s.44 AA96. 
The situation was clarified in Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP 
[2013] UKSC 35. In this case ManCe concluded that “Where an injunction is sought to restrain foreign proceedings in breach 
of an arbitration agreement - whether on an interim or a final basis and whether at a time when arbitral proceedings are or are 
not on foot or proposed - the source of the power to grant such an injunction is to be found not in section 44 of the 1996 Act, 
but in section 37 of the 1981 Act. Such an injunction is not “for the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings”, but for 
the purposes of and in relation to the negative promise contained in the arbitration agreement not to bring foreign proceedings, 
which applies and is enforceable regardless of whether or not arbitral proceedings are on foot or proposed” (ibidem [48]).
9  In JSC AMC Ingosstrakh Investments v BNP Paribas SA [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 649 the Court of Appeal held that anti-suit 
injunctions can also be addressed to a third party seeking to assist the party to the arbitration agreement in bringing the wrongful 
foreign proceedings by way of collusion.
10  The anti-suit injunctions will not be granted where the foreign proceedings are at an advanced stage. In The Angelic 
Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 it was held that a decision of the Court of Appeal must be deemed as the deadline to grant an 
anti-suit injunction.
11  According to Article 26 of Brussels I Bis Regulation – with similar verbatim to Article 24 Regulation Brussels I and Ar-
ticle 18 of the Brussels Convention - submission by the claimant takes place when he registers the claim against the defendant. 
On the other hand, the defendant’s submission takes place when he enters an appearance, unless he does so to contest the juris-
diction of the court, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter by virtue of Article 24 of the Regulation.
12  Firstly, in Turner v Grovit [2004] ECJ C-159/02 the European Court of Justice held that anti-suit injunctions granted in 
case of breach of a jurisdiction agreement was not consistent with the Brussels Convention 1968. The ECJ concluded that the 
Convention had to be interpreted “as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a contracting state prohibits a 
party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another contracting 
state, even where the party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrate the existing proceedings.” (ibidem [31]) Following 
this approach, in West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2009] ECJ - C-185/07. the Court 
held that anti-suit injunctions granted in breach of an arbitration agreement indirectly interferes with the competence of the 
court exercising or resolving the dispute jurisdiction. See also: D. JosePh, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and Their 
Enforcements (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) p. 402; a.L. CaLvo CaravaCa, J. CarrasCosa GonzáLez & C. CaaMiña DoMin-
Guez, Litigación Internacional… op. cit. p. 176–178; C. oJieGbe, ‘From West…' p. 273–277.
13  a.L. CaLvo CaravaCa/J. CarrasCosa GonzáLez/C. CaaMiña DoMinGuez, Litigación Internacional… op. cit. p. 176.
14  Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
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according to the Regulation would entitle the complying party to resist within British jurisdiction the 
recognition and enforcement of any later inconsistent judgment which could be rendered by the courts 
of another member state of the European Union.
6. The structure of the project is divided into two parts: the first one deals with the regulation 
of the enforcement contained in section 66, and the second copes with the possibility to enforce a 
declaratory award and its use to protect the negative effect of the arbitration agreement. Finally, some 
conclusions will be held.
II. Enforcement of the arbitral award under s.66 AA96
1. Introduction
7. Apart from the implementation of the Geneva15 and the New York Convention16, the Arbi-
tration Act 1996 recognises two methods to enforce an arbitral award: the common law remedy of the 
action on the award and the summary procedure of section 66. Though the party is free to opt for one or 
the other the advantages of the latter outweighs the former’s, resulting so in a residual use of the tradi-
tional action on the award.
8. Section 66(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that “nothing in this section affects the rec-
ognition and enforcement of an award under any other enactment or rules of law, (…) or by an action on 
the award” and section 81 “provides for the survival of common law rights consistent with 1996 Act”17.
9. The basis of the action on the award is the implied obligation of the parties to an arbitration 
agreement to perform the award. Where a party dishonours the award, the counterparty is to be entitled 
to claim for the breach of this implied obligation and to seek a judgment from the court for the same 
relief as the granted by the award18.
10. Despite its statutory recognition, the action on the award “is little used in practice” 19 and its 
use seems to be limited to two groups of cases: firstly, where the award was made pursuant to an arbitra-
tion agreement which does not satisfy the broad definition contained in the Act20; and secondly, where 
the enforcement under section 66 is unsuitable because the debtor resists the enforcement on grounds 
which raise factual issues requiring full investigation21.
11. On the other hand, sections 66(1) and (2) – mirroring former section 26 of the Arbitration 
Act 195022 - envisage two difference methods to enforce the arbitral award: the leave of the court to 
enforce the award “in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court”23 and the conversion of the 
award into a judgment24. 
15  s.99 AA96.
16  s.100 – 104 AA96.
17  C. aMbrose/ h. suMPtion/ k. MaxweLL, London Maritime Arbitration (4th edn, Informa Law 2017) para 23.19.
18  C. aMbrose/h. suMPtion/ k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.21; D. sutton & J. GiLL, Russell on Arbitra-
tion (23rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) para 8–015.
19  National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd (The Amazon Reefer) [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 [6].
20  Goldstein v Cenley [2002] 1 WLR 281 294.
21  C. aMbrose, h. suMPtion & k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.13.
22  This provision read as follows: “An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of the High Court or a judge there-
of, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect, and where leave is so given, judgment may be 
entered in terms of the award”.
23  s.66(1) AA96.
24  s.66(2) AA96.
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12. Originally, these methods to enforce the award were a “summary form of proceedings in-
tended to dispense with the full formalities of the action to enforce an award”25 whose scope of applica-
tion was restricted to “reasonable clear cases”26. However, the procedures were developed and currently, 
as Lord Denning remarked, can “be used in nearly all cases”27
13. Since these procedures contained in section 66 are exclusively based on documentary ev-
idence28, they are quicker, cheaper and therefore more popular than the action on the award. In the 
following lines, both are to be examined along with their scope of application and the defences which 
might be triggered to resist the enforcement of the award. 
2. Scope of application: the award
14. The procedures provided in sections 66(1) and (2) are restricted to the enforcement of ar-
bitral awards which are made pursuant to arbitration agreements which satisfy the statutory definition 
contained in sections 5 and 6 of the Act29. 
15. Based on Art.7 of the Model Law, sections 5 and 6 establish that either the “strict” arbitration 
agreement – understood as the agreement to submit all or certain contractual or non-contractual disputes 
which might arise between the parties of a legal relationship - or the submission agreement – understood 
as the agreement to submit contractual or non-contractual disputes which have already arisen out of a 
legal relationship -30 must be in writing31. For the purposes of the Act, the agreement will be in writing:
a)   Where the agreement is made in writing32.
b)   Where it is made by exchange of communications in writing33.
c)   Where the agreement is evinced in writing34, admitting electronic means of communication35 
such as email36.
d)   Where the agreement is evinced in writing if the agreement was made otherwise than in 
writing and was recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party with the authority of the 
parties37.
e)   Where the agreement is contained in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in 
which the existence of the arbitration agreement was alleged by one party and not denied by 
the other38.
f)   And finally, where in a contract there is a reference to any writing document containing an 
arbitration clause provided that this express reference is such as to make that clause part of 
the incorporating contract39.
25  National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Ltd (The Amazon Reefer) [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 [7].
26  Boks & Co v Peter, Rushton & Co Ltd [1919] KB 491 497.
27  Middlemiss & Gould v Hartlepool Corporation [1972] 1 WLR 1643 1647.
28  “The application proceeds upon the basis of documentary evidence only, and no witness are called to give evidence at the 
hearing of the application.” (C. aMbrose, h. suMPtion & k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.8).
29  D. sutton & J. GiLL, Russell on… op. cit. para 8–014.
30  Art.6(1) AA96 establishes that an arbitration agreement means “an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future 
disputes (whether they are contractual or not)”, 
31  Art. 7(1) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(1) AA96.
32  Art. 7(3) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(2)(a) AA96.
33  Art. 7(3) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(2)(b) AA96.
34  s.5(2)(c) AA96.
35  Art. 7(4) of the Model Law 2006 requires the information contained therein to be accessible so as to useable for subse-
quent reference.
36  In Bernuth Lines Ltd v High Seas Shipping Ltd [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537, the Court held that an email constituted writing 
for the purposes of recording an arbitration agreement.
37  Art. 7(3) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(4) AA96.
38  Art. 7(5) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(5) AA96.
39  Art. 7(6) of the Model Law 2006 and s.5(3) and 6(2) AA96.
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16. Unlike it will happen with New York and Geneva conventional awards, section 66 makes no 
reference to the seat of arbitration. This means that the procedures enacted in this provision are appli-
cable irrespective of the location of the seat of the arbitration40. Consequently, section 66 is applicable 
where the award is made pursuant to an arbitration whose seat was either in England, Wales or Northern 
Ireland41, or outside these countries42.
17. The expression “award” not only refers to the decision made by the tribunal determining 
the rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute43, but also to the agreed awards44. On the contrary, 
preliminary or interim decisions, procedural orders, directions or any order of the tribunal granting relief 
on a provisional basis fall outside sections 66(1) and (2)45. Therefore, the enforcement of the peremptory 
orders which the Tribunal might grant during the proceedings is not to be under section 66, but under 
section 4246.
40  r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 262. s.3 AA96 defines the seat of arbitration as the judicial seat 
of the arbitration and it can be designated: (a) by the parties to the arbitration agreement; (b) by any arbitral or other institution 
or person vested by the parties with powers in that regard, or (c) by the arbitral tribunal if so authorised by the parties. Besides, 
in the absence of such designation, s.3 AA96 provides that it can be determined having regard to the parties’ agreement and all 
the relevant circumstances.
41  s.2(1) AA96. In this situation, the provisions listed in Schedule 1- sections 9-11 (stay of legal proceedings), 12 (power 
of court to extent agreed time limits), 13 (application of Limitation Acts), 24 (power of the court to remove arbitrator), 26(1) 
(effect of death of arbitrator), 28 (liability of parties for fees and expenses of arbitrators), 29 (immunity of arbitrator), 31 (objec-
tion to substantive jurisdiction of tribunal), 32 (determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction), 33 (general duty of tribunal), 
37(2) (items to be treated as expenses of arbitrators), 40 (general duty of parties), 43 (securing the attendance of witnesses), 
56 (power to withhold award in case of non-payment), 60 (effectiveness of agreement for payment of costs in any event), 66 
(enforcement of award), 67 – 68 (challenging the award: lack of substantive jurisdiction and serious irregularity), 70 – 71 (sup-
plementary provision and effect of order of court), 72 (saving for rights of person who takes no part in proceedings), 73 (loss 
of right to object), 74 (immunity of arbitral institutions) and 75 (charge to secure payment of solicitors’ cost) - are mandatory 
and, consequently, have effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. [s.4(1) AA96].
42  s.2(2) AA96. Besides, this section provides that sections 9 – 11 (stay of legal proceedings) and section 66 (enforcement 
of arbitral awards) apply even if the seat has not been designated or determined. 
On the other hand, following s.2(3) AA96, where the seat of the arbitration is outside England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
or no seat has been designated or determined, s.43 (securing the attendance of witnesses) and 44 (court power exercisable in 
support of arbitral proceeding) might be applicable provided that, in the opinion of the court, it is appropriate to do so. See 
‘Departmental Advisory…’ op. cit. para 25.
43  J. hiLL & a. ChonG, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts (4th edn, Hart 
Publishing 2010) para 24.1.7.
44  According to s.51(2) AA96, an agreed award is an award which records the settlement agreement of the parties during the 
arbitral proceedings. As stated in s.51(3) AA96, these awards have the same status and effect as any other award on the merits.
45  D. sutton & J. GiLL, Russell on… op. cit. paras 8–011. In Australia – whose s.8(2) of the International Arbitration Act 
1974 has a similar wording to s.66(1) AA96 – in Re Resort Condominiums International Inc [1995] 1 Qd 406 the Court held 
that interlocutory or procedural orders did not constitute “foreign award” within the meaning of the Act and were consequently 
not enforceable under that provision.
46  Peremptory orders are regulated in s.41(5) – (7) of Act. The peremptory order may be made where a party, without show-
ing sufficient cause, fails to comply with an order or direction of the tribunal (s.41(5) AA96). These orders are enforcement 
measures in respect of existing directions or orders [r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 163–164] and 
consequently, “a peremptory order must be “to the same effect” as the preceding order which was disobeyed.” [‘Departmental 
Advisory…’ op. cit. para 209].
The consequence of the failure to comply with a peremptory order is to depend upon the kind of order disobeyed: where the 
party fail to comply with a peremptory order to provide security for costs, the arbitral tribunal may make an award dismissing 
his claim [s.41(6) AA96]; on the other hand, where the party fails to comply with any other kind, without prejudice to the pos-
sibility to enforce by the court under s.42 AA96, the arbitral tribunal can: (a) direct that the party in default shall not be entitled 
to rely upon any allegation or material which was the subject matter of the order; (b) draw such adverse inferences from the act 
of non-compliance as the circumstances justify; (c) proceed to an award on the basis of such materials as have been properly 
provided to it; and (d) make such order as it thinks fit as to the payment of costs of the arbitration incurred in consequence of 
the non-compliance. [s.41(7) AA96]
For their enforcement, the Act requires:
a.   That the parties have not excluded from their arbitral proceedings the enforcement of peremptory orders. The wording 
of s.42(1) AA96 is clear when it provides that “otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may make an order requiring a 
party to comply with a peremptory order made by the tribunal.” Besides, s.42 AA96 is not among the provisions deemed 
as mandatory by Schedule 1 of the Act.
b.   An application for the enforcement of the peremptory order made either by the tribunal upon notice to the parties [s.42(2)
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3. Enforcement under s.66(1) AA96
18. Before being enforced “in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court”47 is neces-
sary to obtain the permission or leave of the court. This application is usually made without notice to the 
other party and it must be supported by written evidence48 and:
a)  Exhibit the arbitration agreement and the original award (or copies)49.
b)   State the names and the usual or last known place of residence or business of the claimant 
and of the person against whom it is sought the enforcement of the award50.
c)   And finally, state that either the award has not been complied or the extent to which it has 
been complied with at the date of the application51.
19. Where the leave is so given, all the means to enforce a judgment of the Court are to be avail-
able to enforce the award, including worldwide freezing orders52. On the other hand, the leave can be 
restricted only to a part of the award provided that the award is drafted so as to make possible that part 
of the award to be enforced53.
20. The leave of the Court cannot correct possible deficiencies in the award54. Besides, it does 
not amount to a Court order in its right55, and consequently, if the losing party dishonours the award 
enforced such behaviour will not be in contempt of court56.
4. Enforcement under s.66(2) AA96
21. Once the permission is given, section 66(2) empowers the Court to give a “judgment entered 
in terms of the award”. This mechanism results in the conversion of the award into a judgment. Hence, 
it can be said that it permits the enforcement of the judgment made by the court rather than the award 
made by the arbitral tribunal57.
(a) AA96] or by any party to the arbitral proceedings with the permission of the tribunal and upon notice to the other 
parties [s.42(2)(b) AA96]. This permission might not be necessary where the parties have agreed that the powers of 
the court to enforce peremptory orders under s.42 AA96 shall available in relation to the arbitral proceedings they are 
involved. “It is possible that the intention behind section 42(2)(c) was that no permission from the tribunal would be 
required if the parties had positively pre-agreed to allow applications under section 42 (without specifying the condi-
tions). Such positive pre-agreements are fairly rare (unknown to the authors) and are not contained in any of the standard 
arbitral institutional rules. In practice, the safer option for a party is to seek the tribunal’s permission.” [r.M Merkin & L. 
FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 166]”. The same is suggested by the DAC Report: “The court should have power 
to order compliance with [peremptory orders], though (unless both parties have agreed) these can only be invoked with 
the permission of the tribunal” [‘Departmental Advisory…’ op. cit. para 212] - 
c.   The applicant must have exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of failure to comply with the tribunal’s order. 
[s.42(3) AA96]
d.   The person against whom the order was directed has failed to comply with it within the time prescribed in the order or, 
if not time was specified, within a reasonable time. [s.42(4) AA96]
47  s.66(1) AA96.
48  Rule 62.18(6) CPR.
49  Rule 62.18(6)(a)(i) CPR.
50  Rule 62.18(6)(b) CPR.
51  Rule 62.18(6)(c) CPR.
52  This happened in Aiglon Ltd & L’Aiglon SA v Gau Shan Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 164.
53  In TTMI Ltd of England v ASM Shipping Ltd of India [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 401, CLarke seems “to have assumed that 
section 66 give to the court a power of partial enforcement of an award.” (IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (No 2) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 59 [102]). See C. aMbrose, h. suMPtion & k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. 
paras 23.35-23.36; h.r DunDas, ‘Partial Enforcement of Arbitral Awards’ (2008) 74 Arbitration 330.
54  Walker v Rowe [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 116; Pirtek v Deanswood [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 728.
55  “An order allowing the claimant to execute an award as if it was a judgment is comparable to an exequatur as applicable 
in civil law systems.”(ED & F Man Sugar Ltd v Lendoudis [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 579 [33]).
56  ASM Shipping Co Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England (No 2) [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 155.
57  r.M Merkin/L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 263.
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22. The conversion means that the judgment must have the same terms as the award58. As it 
occurs with the leave examined above, the Court cannot introduce any amendment, qualification or 
correction to the award. This can result in odd situations such as the enforcement of an award which 
specifies payment within a fixed period of time which has already expired59.
23. The mechanism contained in section 66(2) has 3 advantages and a drawback:
a) Advantages:
i.  Since the Court is giving a judgment, section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838 will apply60. 
Thus, where a party does not comply with the Judgment, the Court will be entitled to make 
an order for the payment of interests payable from the date of conversion of the award61.
ii.  According to section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980, the time limit for the enforcement of 
awards is 6 years. However, it has been suggested that this period may be extended where 
section 66(2) is triggered and it is sought the enforcement of the judgment62.
iii.  Unlike the leave, the failure to honour the judgment entered in terms of the award is to 
amount to contempt of court63.
b) Disadvantage: Due to the merger of the award with the judgment, the latter may no longer be enforce-
able under international instruments such as the Geneva and the New York Conventions64. Nevertheless, 
this limitation is limited to the English territory65 and, consequently, the award would still be enforceable 
as such under these instruments in any other contracting state66, provided that it satisfies the relevant 
conventional conditions for its enforcement67.
5. Defences and the right to raise an objection:
24. Under the Act and the Model Law, there is a strong presumption as to the validity of the 
enforceable award68. Hence, contrary to what it occurs with the action on the award69, “the party who has 
58  In accordance with Cooke : “It is true that section 66 of the Act refers to enforcement of an award in the same manner as 
a judgment or order of the court to the same effect and that, where leave is so given to do so, “judgment may be entered in terms 
of the award”. Decision of Aikens J (as he then was), Moore-Bick J (as he then was) and Beatson (as he then was) support the 
proposition that a judgment so entered must truly be “in terms of the award”, in other words, in identical terms, and I do not 
think that this is in doubt.”(Konkola Copper Mines v U & M Mining Zambia (No 2) [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 649 [100]).
59  Colliers International Property Consultants & another v Colliers Jordan Lee Jafaar Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 368.
60  This provision reads as follows:
“(1)   Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of 8 pounds per centum per annum from such time as shall be 
prescribed by rules of court until the same shall be satisfied, and such interest may be levied under a writ of execution 
on such judgment.
  (2)   Rules of court may provide for the court to disallow all or part of any interest otherwise payable under subsection (1).”
61  Gater Assets Ltd v NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy [2008] EWHC 1108 (Comm) [29].
62  Mr Phillips submits that it would be contrary to public policy to give effect to an action on the judgment. To do so would, 
he submits, circumvent section 7 of the Limitation Act which precludes the bringing of an action to enforce an award more 
than six years after the date when the cause of action accrued. I am not persuaded that this is so. The Limitation Act provides a 
six-year limitation period (in most cases) for claims under an original cause of action, claims to enforce an award, and claims 
to enforce a judgment. It makes no provision that an action on a judgment may not be brought within six years of the judgment 
if the judgment is one which gives effect to an award.” (ED & F Man Sugar Ltd v Lendoudis [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 579 [53]).
63  r.M Merkin/ L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 262.
64  D. sutton/ J. GiLL, Russell on… op. cit. paras 8–007. “Upon entering judgment, the award merges into the judgment and 
no longer exists in law.” (C. aMbrose, h. suMPtion & k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.9).
65  According to DarMon: “The merger of the award must be regarded as limited to the territory of the court which delivered 
the judgment and only the award must be taken into account for the purpose of recognition and enforcement in other state.” 
(Marc Rich & Co v Societá Italiana Impianti PA Case C-190/89 [1991] ECR I - 3855 [69]).
66  “The award can therefore be deemed to remain a cause of action for enforcement in other States.” [a. v.D. berG, The New 
York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 1981) 347].
67  J. hiLL & a. ChonG, International Commercial… op. cit. para 24.6.12.
68  “The party who has an award is entitled to start from the position of validity.” (Sovarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] 
EWHC 1661 (Comm) [47]).
69  In an action on the award, the claimant must show that the arbitrators had substantive jurisdiction. In this sense, the 
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obtained an award has the benefit of a presumption of validity and it is for the party resisting recognition 
or enforcement to prove otherwise”70.
25. Following a House of Lords amendment71, the lawmaker opted for not including an enu-
meration of the grounds to refuse the enforcement. Despite not being exhaustively enlisted, the grounds 
seem to be limited to the following:
a)   Want of substantive jurisdiction72. The act provides that the “leave to enforce an award shall 
not be given where, or to the extent that, the person against whom it is sought to be enforced 
shows that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction”73.
b)   Defects in form or substance. In order to be enforceable, the award must unambiguously 
deal with all the issues between the parties.74 Where the award does not satisfy these require-
ments, it will be necessary to previously remedy such defects75.
c)   Not arbitrable dispute76.
d)   Limitation. The Limitation Act 1980 establishes a time limit of 6 years to the action to en-
force the awards77. This time runs from the date of the breach of the implied obligation to 
honour the award which arises when the award is made78. 
e)   Public Policy. Section 81(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act 1996 expressly empowers the court to 
refuse the recognition and enforcement of the award where this recognition and enforcement 
would be contrary to the public policy.
f)  State Immunity.
26. On the other hand, similarly to Article 4 of the Model Law, sections 66(3) and 73 of the Act 
provides that the right to raise an objection can be lost79. The Act distinguishes between the party who 
claimant will have to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement and the award and besides he will have to establish that 
the dispute was within the terms of the submission and that the arbitrators were duly appointed. See M.J MustiLL & s.C boyD, 
Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Butterworths Law 1989) 418–419. 
70  Sovarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] EWHC 1661 (Comm) [43].
71  In words of Fraser oF CarMyLLie: “The clause as drafted gives a non-exhaustive list of grounds on which leave to enforce 
an award in the same manner as a judgment shall not be given by the court. The list is non-exhaustive, but we see a danger in 
specifying only some of the relevant matters. Parties may be led astray by thinking that matters which are not mentioned are 
not covered. That is not the case. We have given some thought to constructing an exhaustive list, but it would be difficult to be 
absolutely sure that all matters had been covered. On balance now we think it would be preferable to exclude the list altogether 
from the Bill. I beg to move.” [Hansard 1803 – Lord Sitting of 18 March 1996 (Series 5 – Vol. 570), p.1880].
72  s.30 AA96 contains the statutory recognition of the famous principle kompetenz-kompetenz. According to this provision, 
the substantive jurisdiction under the Act is confined to 3 different elements: (a) the validity of the arbitration agreement, (2) 
the proper constitution of the tribunal and (c) the scope of the arbitration agreement. Apart from sections 30 and 66(3), other 
provisions which deal with the concept of substantive jurisdiction are: s.31, 32, 67 and 72.
73  s.66(3) AA96.
74  C. aMbrose/h. suMPtion/ k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.27.
75  Unless otherwise agreed by the parties [s.57(1) AA96], under the Act, the correction of the award so as to clarify or 
remove any ambiguity can be made by the tribunal on its own initiative or on the application of a party to the arbitral proceed-
ings. [s.57(2)(a) AA96] In this situation, the correction shall be made by the tribunal within 28 days after the reception of the 
application or, where the correction is made by the tribunal on its own initiative, within 28 days after the award was made. 
[s.57(5) AA96] In both cases, the correction is to form part of the award. [s.57(7) AA96] Similar rules can be found on Art. 36 
of the ICC Rules or Art.33 of the Unictral in the Model Law on Commercial Arbitration.
76  Are not arbitrable disputes whose subject matter is a matter of law not justiciable – see O’Callaghan v Coral Racing 
Ltd [1998] App LR 11/19 (CA) for a case involving unenforceable wager or Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group v Golden 
Ocean Group and others [2013] EWHC 1063 for a case of illegality – or disputes not capable of private resolution because they 
involved the rights of children, criminal law or inalienable statutory rights – see Exeter City AFC v Football Conference Ltd 
[2004] 4 All ER 1179 regarding the inalienable rights of the parties in the bankruptcy of a company -.
77  s.6 of the Limitation Act 1980.
78  C. aMbrose/ h. suMPtion/ k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.28.
79  Contrary to the Model Law, the Act requires “a party to the arbitration proceedings who has taken part or continued 
to take part without raising the objection in due time, to show that at that stage he neither knew nor could with reasonable 
diligence have discovered the grounds for his objection (the latter being an important modification to the Model Law, without 
which one would have to demonstrate actual knowledge, which may be virtually impossible to do).” [‘Departmental Adviso-
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decides to take part in the proceedings and the one who decides not to do so. Whereas the latter unlim-
itedly conserves its right to challenge the award on any ground80, the former’s right will be restricted to 
the objections already risen during the proceedings and to those ones either unknown or which could 
not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at that time81. The intention of the act is to avoid 
obstructive behaviours which might seek to delay proceeding or to avoid honouring the award82 by re-
quiring the parties “to “put up or shut up” if a challenge is to be made”83.
III. Use of s.66 AA96 against torpedo actions
1. A shield judgment against a Torpedo Action
27. The following case illustrates the scenario which is to be examined in this section: X – a 
Spanish company – and Y – a Welsh company – enters into a “CIF Swansea” contract which incorpo-
rates an agreement to arbitrate in Belfast with English law to apply all the disputes which might arise 
under the contract. Whereas Y commences the arbitral proceedings in Belfast, X rejects the validity of 
the arbitration agreement and, instead of challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal before the own tri-
bunal, it opts for bringing in the dispute before the Spanish courts asserting the nullity of the arbitration 
agreement and the judicial jurisdiction on the dispute in accordance with Brussels I Bis Regulation.
28. In this context, a “torpedo action” is an action brought in breach of an arbitration agreement 
before a European Court with the intention to obtain a relief not only more favourable than the one like-
ly to be granted by the arbitral tribunal but also capable of being recognised and enforced in any other 
member state under the privileged system provided by Brussels I Bis Regulation.
29. This conduct misuses the European framework on the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters in order to demolish the binding nature of the arbitration agree-
ment. In bad faith, the claimant seeks to avoid the adverse consequences which might stem from arbi-
tration by asserting the competence of a more favourable jurisdiction.
30. Unlike the so-called “Italian Torpedos”84, this action is not based upon the Lis Pendens 
rule, but upon the arbitration exception85. Following the previous European legislation, Article 2(1)(d) 
of Brussels I Bis Regulation provides that the regulation shall not apply to arbitration and Paragraph 3 
of Recital 12, delimitating the scope of this exception, remarks that “where a court of a Member State, 
exercising jurisdiction under the Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this should not preclude that 
court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being recognised or, as the case may be, enforced 
ry…’ op. cit. para 297).
80  s.72 AA96.
81  s.73(1) AA96.
82  ‘Departmental Advisory…’ op. cit. para 297.
83  ‘Departmental Advisory…’ op. cit. para 105. “The broad effect of [s.73 AA96] is to prevent a party from relying upon 
its right to challenge any aspect of the proceedings or the award for want of jurisdiction or irregularity, if it has participated in 
the proceedings with (actual or constructive) knowledge of the problem, but without having registered an objection promptly.” 
(r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 358).
84  “A person who has just reason to believe he might soon be accused of infringement and be summoned in a Contract-
ing State with a cross-border injunction has the possibility to initiate proceedings in another State asking for a declaration of 
non-infringement with effect throughout Europe in the countries where he may be attacked; thus paralysing the cross-border 
injunction. (…) [This] strategy is commonly known as the “Italian torpedo”.” (v. JanDoLi, ‘The “Italian Torpedo”’ [2000] 31 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 783, 788).
85  For a deep analysis of the situation of ‘Italian Torpedos’ under the Brussels I Bis Regulation see i. berGson, ‘The Death 
of the Torpedo Action? The Practical Operation of the Recast’s Reforms to Enhance the Protection for Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Agreements within the European Union’ (January 2, 2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 1.
Recognition and enforcement of declaratory awards under english law as an effective method …Javier Pérez Font
316Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2019), Vol. 11, Nº 2, pp. 306-325
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4960
in accordance with this Regulation”86. This follows the doctrine previously established by the European 
Court of Justice in the Marc Rich case87.
31. What can the counterparty to an English arbitration agreement do against an action of this 
kind? As it was previously referred, the decision adopted in The Front Comor88 has severely limited his 
options. In ordinary circumstances, it would be suggested to claim before the seized court for a stay of 
the proceedings; however, it is likely that the party in breach of the arbitration agreement has taken this 
possibility into account and sought a jurisdiction where the stay is likely to be dismissed. Thus, his best 
defence is to move as quickly as possible in order to get a ruling from the arbitral tribunal declaring 
its own jurisdiction on the dispute which can subsequently be converted into a judgment under section 
6689. In this way, the recognition and enforcement in England of the later judgment which the member 
state court might render after holding the invalidity of the arbitration clause will find an impediment: the 
defence contained on Art.45(1)(c) of Brussels I Bis. 
32. Out of this defensive strategy at least 3 questions which are to be examined in the following 
lines arise:
a)   Is it possible under English law to enforce a declaratory award?
b)   Is the English court compelled to enforce the declaratory award or it has otherwise discretion 
to do so?
c)   And finally, in accordance with the Brussels I Bis Regulation, are the English decisions made 
pursuant to sections 66(1) and (2) an effective shield against the recognition and enforcement 
of the judgment made by the member state court?
2. Enforcement of declaratory awards under English law:
33. Although this practice has been historically controversial, cases such as Kohn v Wagschal & 
Others90 demonstrate that English Courts use section 66 to enforce declaratory awards.
86  Contrary to what the United Kingdom expressed at the time of the negotiations for its adhesion to the Brussels Convention 
“Proceedings before a court are not excluded from the scope of the Regulation just because they are, in the view of other Member 
States, covered by an arbitration agreement. The fact that the court of origin took jurisdiction after deciding that an arbitration 
agreement was invalid or inapplicable does not disentitle the resulting judgment from recognition and enforcement under the 
Regulation.” (t.C hartLey, ‘The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration’ International & Comparative Law Quaterly 859).
87  In Marc Rich & Co v Societá Italiana Impianti PA a Swiss bought oil from an Italian Seller. The Oil became contaminated 
and a dispute arose about who was liable. The seller sought a declaration of non-liability in Italy and the Buyer commenced 
arbitral proceedings in London. Since the seller refused to take part in the proceedings, the buyer asked English courts to ap-
point the arbitrator, as well as permission to serve the proceedings out of the jurisdiction. Both orders were granted, and the 
seller argued that the dispute fell within the scope of Brussels Convention and that the competent courts were the Italian, not 
the British. Consequently, the seller claimed for setting aside the order. The court held that “if by virtue of its subject-matter 
(…) a dispute fall outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in 
order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify the application of the Convention” (ibid 26). Since the 
subject-matter of the dispute was the appointment of an arbitrator, the Court concluded that the case fell within the exception.
(ibid 29). See J. hiLL & a. ChonG, International Commercial… op. cit. p. 71–72; z.s. tanG & n. Dowers, ‘Arbitration in EU 
Jurisdiction Regulation: Brussels I Recast and a New Proposal’ (2015) 3 Groningen Journal of International Law 125, 137.
88  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2009] ECJ - C-185/07.
89  There are other alternatives routes to get a judgment declaring the jurisdiction, but they are less preferable: “either via a 
section 32 jurisdictional ruling (with a tribunal’s permission) (…) or in the context of, for example, an application under section 
18 (if challenged on jurisdiction) or section 44 (ditto).” (r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 287–288).
90  Kohn v Wagschal &Others [2006] EWHC 3356 (Comm). In this case, some heirs – the daughters and the son of Mr. Is 
Kohn - were unable to agree on the distribution of the inheritance and agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the Beth Din 
applying Jewish Law. The deceased had put some shares into the names of his daughters, who were unaware of this fact and 
had never received any dividend from them. The tribunal had to decide whether these shares were a gift to his children during 
his lifetime – which meant that each one of the children were entitled to 20% of the shares – or, on the contrary, they remained 
as part of the deceased’s estate until his death – which meant that in accordance with Jewish Law, on death the shares would 
pass to the son  -. The lack of intention by the Deceased to gift the shares was demonstrated and the Tribunal concluded that the 
shares had been put into the names of the daughters with the intention to move theses shares out of the reach of the widow and 
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34. The controversy starts with Margulies Brothers Ltd v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK) Ltd91. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that an award granting the set-off of certain contracts and the 
payment of the difference among them could not be enforced as a judgment under former section 26 of 
the Arbitration Act 1950. Although the words of Lord Evershed92 could result in the unenforceability of 
a declaratory award, in that case, the uncertainty and ambiguity rendered the award incapable of being 
enforced, not its declaratory form.93
35. In Tongyuan (USA) International Trading Group v Uni-Clan Ltd94, Moore-Bick following 
the Margulies Brothers Ltd case firstly recognised that an award formulated in purely declaratory terms 
cannot be enforced95; however, subsequently, he added that a declaratory award “framed in terms which 
would make sense if those were translated straight into the body of a judgment” could be enforced96.
36. Ten years later, the limits of this view were tested in West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Gen-
erali Assicurazione Generali SpA97. In this case, a charterparty between the claimant – the owner of the 
vessel “Front Comor” – and Erg Petroli SpA – the charterer, subrogated in the proceedings by its insur-
ers - incorporated an arbitration clause which stipulated that all the disputes arising out of the charter 
were to be referred to arbitration in London with English Law to apply. 
37. A collision between the vessel and a pier owned by the charterer caused extensive damage 
rendering the berth unusable for a long period. Whereas the owner referred his claims regarding this 
incident to arbitration, the defendants brought theirs against the owner in the courts of Italy.
38. On 21st March 2005, an anti-suit injunction restraining the defendants to resume the judicial 
proceedings in Italy was granted. On the other hand, on 12th November 2008, the arbitral tribunal found 
that the owners were under no liability to the defendants for the damages caused by the collision.
39. Despite this award, the Defendants continued the proceedings brought in Italy. The claimant 
- concerned with the fact that the Defendants could obtain a judgment in their favour which subsequent-
ly could be enforced in England under the Brussels Regulation98 - sought the conversion of the award 
into a judgment under section 66. His thinking was that, in accordance with Article 34(3) of Brussel I 
Regulation, such conversion would preclude English Courts from recognising an irreconcilable poten-
tial Italian judgment. In addition, he thought that the existence of the English judgment would render 
the recognition of the future Italian judgment contrary to the public policy in England and Wales, and 
consequently, he could shield himself behind the exception contained in Article 34(1) of Brussels I.
to avoid inheritance taxes. Consequently, the tribunal declared that the shares belonged to the son who then obtained an order 
from the High Court under s.66 AA96 to enforce the award in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court. Despite the 
application to set aside the order made by the Daughter, Morison J upheld the order of the High Court and the award declaring 
the son as heir of the shares was enforced.
91  [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 205.
92  “You cannot enforce a document which merely says by way of declaration (in effect) that certain contracts with three 
numbers should be set against certain other contracts with three other numbers and that [the defendant] ought to pay the differ-
ence between them.” [Margulies Brothers Ltd v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK) Ltd [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 205 207].
93  African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei KG [2011] EWHC 2542 (Comm) 
[22]. As Moore-biCk said in the Margulies Brothers Ltd case the Court of Appeal concluded that, not only the award was not an 
award for a sum certain, but also, it was an unenforceable award “because it did not make its effect sufficiently clear.” (Tongyu-
an (USA) International Trading Group v Uni-Clan Ltd (2001) QDB (Comm) [8]).
94  (2001) QDB (Comm).
95  “An award which is effectively couched in purely declaratory terms cannot be enforced as a judgment.” [Tongyuan 
(USA) International Trading Group v Uni-Clan Ltd (2001) QDB (Comm) [8].
96  ibidem.
97  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm) and West Tankers 
Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27.
98  Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters.
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40. Apart from the fact that, as it was referred before, this case resulted in the infamous decision 
on the incompatibility of the anti-suit injunctions with the European regulation99, it demonstrates that the 
enforcement of a declaratory award is possible under the Arbitration Act.
41. Undoubtedly, the enforcement of declaratory awards seems to be contrary to the ordinary 
and natural meaning of the enforcement. A declaratory decision “decides some questions as to the re-
spective rights and obligations of the parties”100, but it does not compel a party to do or not to do some-
thing101. However, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the impossibility to use the ordinary methods 
of execution provided under the CPR102 does not result in the impossibility to give judicial force to a 
declaratory award on the same footing as a judgment103. This broader interpretation of the term “enforce-
ment” is deemed by the court as “closer to the purpose of the [Arbitration] Act and makes better sense 
in the context of the way in which arbitration works”104.
42. Following the interpretation made in Tridon Australia Pty Ltd v ACD Tridon Inc (Incorporated 
in Ontario)105 by the New South Wales Court of Appeal of a provision whose wording was similar to sec-
tion 66106, the High Court of Justice held that “The purpose of sections 66(1) and (2) is to provide a mean 
by which the victorious party in an arbitration can obtain the material benefit of the award in his favour 
(…) Where the award is in the nature of a declaration and there is no appreciable risk of the losing party 
obtaining an inconsistent judgment in a member state which he might try to enforce within the jurisdiction, 
leave will not generally stand to be granted because the victorious party will not thereby obtain any benefit 
which he does not already have by virtue of the award per se. (…) Where, however, as here, the victorious 
party’s objective in obtaining an order under s.66((1) and (2) is to establish the primacy of a declaratory 
award over an inconsistent judgment, the court will have jurisdiction to make an s.66 order because to 
do so will be to make a positive contribution to the securing of the material benefit of the award.”107 This 
judgment and reasoning of Field J were unanimously upheld later by the Court of Appeal108.
43. In African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei 
KG109, a bill of lading incorporated a London arbitration clause from a charterparty. The claimant had 
to carry the defendant’s cargo from Constanta in Romania to Lagos in Nigeria. The dispute arose out 
of the grounding of the vessel off Kythira Island when General Average was declared. Although the 
arbitration had to take place in London, the defendant commenced arbitration and judicial proceedings 
in Romania. Meanwhile, an English Court gave the claimant, under section 66, permission to enforce 
a declaratory arbitral award and to enter judgment against the defendant, and the defendant applied to 
the High Court to set aside that order on the ground that an award made in purely declaratory terms 
could not be enforced110.
44. With the enforcement of the award, the Shipowner sought to obtain an English judgment 
which according to Article 34(3) of Brussel I Regulation would prevent the recognition of an irreconcil-
able subsequent judgment of the Romanian court.
99  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2009] ECJ - C-185/07
100  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm) [22].
101  ibidem [19] and [22].
102  ibidem [25].
103  ibidem [35].
104  ibidem [36].
105  Tridon Australia Pty Ltd v ACD Tridon Inc (Incorporated in Ontario) [2004] NSWCA 146 [11].
106  Section 33(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 reads as follows: “An award made under an arbitration agreement 
may, by leave of the Court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court to the same effect, and where 
leave is so given judgment may be entered in terms of the award.”
107  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm) [28].
108  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27 [39] –[41].
109  African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei KG [2011] EWHC 2542 (Comm).
110  ibidem [1] - [2]. 
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45. Like in the West Tankers Inc case, Beatson held that “the mere fact that the award is declar-
atory in nature need not offend the requirement that, for the purposes of section 66 of the 1996 Act, a 
judgment in the form of the award entered by the leave of the Court must be capable of enforcement by 
one of the available methods of execution”111. Consequently, the Court dismissed the defendant’s appli-
cation to set aside the order to enforce the declaratory award.
3. Discretion to enforce the declaratory award:
46. Like the New York Convention112, the language of sections 66(1) and (2) is permissive113 
and the use of the term “may” results in the recognition of the discretion of the Court whether or not to 
enforce the award114.
47. The discretion is wide and it must be exercised in the interest of justice, embracing issues 
such as the utility of a declaratory judgment115. Thus, the enforcement under these sections is not auto-
matic116 and the court must value the circumstances of the case and determine whether it is appropriate 
or not to enforce the award117.
48. In Nomihold Securities Inc v Mobile Telesystems Finance SA118, the Claimant had sold to the 
Defendant 51% of the shares of a company by a Share Purchase Agreement. The dispute arbitrated by 
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) was whether the Claimant was entitled to exercise 
its put option to sell to the Defendant the balance of 49% of the shares under the Put Option Agreement. 
The Arbitrators concluded that the Claimant was entitled to sell the shares for the agreed purchase price 
plus damages. The enforcement of the award was granted and then challenged on the ground that the 
debtor had no assets within the Jurisdiction and, therefore, there was no legitimate interest in exercising 
the discretion of section 66 as to enforce the award in England.
49. In accordance with the opinion of Burton, unlike monetary award whose enforcement is a 
straightforward operation, declaratory awards can only be enforced under section 66 when there is any 
utility or legitimate interest in such enforcement119. However, this does not amount to place the onus of 
proving the utility or legitimate interest on the claimant120; on the contrary, the lack of utility or legitimate 
interest must be raised by the Defendant when the Court considers the objection to the enforcement121.
111  ibidem [15].
112  In Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company [2002] EWCA Civ 543, ManCe held that Art.V(1) does not introduce an open or ar-
bitrary discretion. In his view, the use of the term “may” intends to enable the court to consider other circumstances which might 
affect the prima facie right of the Defendant to have the enforcement of the award rejected where one or more of the grounds 
enlisted in Art.V(1) NYC have been proved. On the other hand, in Kanoria & Others v Guinness [2006] EWCA Civ 222, May 
held that the scope of this discretion was restricted to those defects which reveals serious infractions in the arbitration and the 
award. Besides, CoLLins in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs of Pakistan 
[2010] UKSC 46 held that such discretion should be applied in a way which gives effect to the principles behind the convention.
This recognition of the discretion and the delimitation of its scope of application were applied in Yukos Capital SARL v 
OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm) and in Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov v OJSC Novolopetsky Metal-
lurgickesky Kombinat [2017] EWHC 1911. In both cases, English Courts opted for enforcing the award despite the proof of 
one of the defences of Art.V(1) NYC.
113  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm) [38].
114  London Steam Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain & The State of France [2013] 
EWHC 3188 (Comm) [182].
115  ibidem [183].
116  r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 264. In words of touLson: It is not “an administrative rub-
ber-stamping exercise”. (West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27 [38])
117  West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA [2012] EWCA Civ 27 [38].
118  [2011] EWHC 2143 (Comm).
119  Nomihold Securities Inc v Mobile Telesystems Finance SA [2011] EWHC 2143 (Comm) [37].
120  ibidem [38].
121  ibidem [39].
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50. Following West Tankers Inc, since there were in parallel enforcement proceedings else-
where, the Court found “appropriate for the Claimant to say that there is a legitimate interest in ob-
taining a decision first from the supervising court”122 and upheld the decision to enforce the award as 
a judgment123.
51. Similarly, in London Steam Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom 
of Spain & The French State124, a P&I Club sought permission pursuant to section 66 to enforce two 
declaratory awards of non-liability as judgments and/or to have judgments entered in their terms. The 
Club’s objective was to obtain an English judgment which would take primacy over any potential incon-
sistent Spanish judgment125. The Defendants resisted the application to enforce this award as a matter of 
jurisdiction – on the ground that they have state immunity – and as a matter of discretion126.
52. Having concluded that the state immunity had been lost pursuant to section 9(1) of the State 
Immunity Act 1978, Hamblen followed West Tankers Inc and African Fertilizers and Chemical NIG Ltd 
(Nigeria) and concluded that the possibility to establish the primacy of the arbitral award over any in-
consistent judgment which could be rendered in Spain represented a clear utility in the interest of justice 
and consequently the discretion had to be exercised to grant the leave of the court127.
4. Judgment Shield vs Regulation Judgment:
53. Brussels I Bis introduced Recital 12 as a guide as how the arbitration exception128 is intended 
to operate129. Instead of introducing changes tackling some of the issues which had arisen concerning the 
relation between the European Regulation and Arbitration, the lawmaker opted for introducing a recital 
summarizing the doctrine about the delimitation of the exception established by European authorities 
throughout history. It goes without saying that by doing so, the lawmaker missed an opportunity to intro-
duce changes which could have increased the attractiveness and effectiveness of arbitration as a method 
to resolve private disputes within the European Union.
54. Under the Regulation, the efficiency of the kind of “torpedo action” examined above de-
pends upon whether the decision of English Courts to enforce the declaratory award can be regarded as a 
judgment which would allow the enforcing party to resist the enforcement of any inconsistent judgment 
rendered by the courts of any other state member130.
55. For the purposes of Brussels I Bis Regulation, a judgment means “any judgment given by 
a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, 
decision or writ of execution, as well as a decision on the determination of costs or expenses by an of-
ficer of the court”131.
56. Either the leave to enforce the arbitral award in the same manner as a judgment or order of 
the court132 or the judgment entered in terms of an award133 satisfy this definition of judgment. However, 
122  ibidem [46].
123  ibidem [92].
124  [2013] EWHC 3188.
125  London Steam Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain & The State of France [2013] 
EWHC 3188 (Comm) [186].
126  ibidem [11].
127  ibidem [188].
128  Art.1(2)(d) Brussels I Bis Regulation.
129  r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 283–284.
130  Art.45(1)(c) Brussels I Bis Regulation and Art. 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
131  Art.2(a) Brussels I Bis Regulation. For an analysis of this provision see: P. Mankowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1 Brussels 
I Bis Regulation - Commentary (1st edn, Otto Schmidt KG : Sellier European Law Publishers 2016) 88–94.
132  s.66(1) AA96.
133  s.66(2) AA96.
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none of them would fall within the scope of the European Regulation: the former because the Fourth 
Paragraph of Recital 12 establishes that “The Regulation should not apply to (…) any judgment con-
cerning the (…) enforcement of an arbitral award.”; and the latter because in the Second Paragraph of 
Recital 12 provides that a judgment “given by a court of Member State as to whether or not an arbitra-
tion agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be subject to 
the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court 
decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental question”.
57. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Article 45(1)(c) of the Regulation does not require 
the judgment of the enforcing country to be a Regulation Judgment, and therefore, either the leave, or 
the judgment entered in terms of the award could be used in England to resist the enforcement of any 
inconsistent judgment rendered in a member state in breach of the arbitration agreement134. This view 
is supported by Waller LJ in The Wadi Sudr135 where he stated: “Might it make any difference if the 
English court had already granted a declaration that an arbitration clause was incorporated before the 
court of a member state considers whether to grant a stay? If in such circumstances a stay were refused 
by the court of a member state then the question might arise as to whether the English court should 
recognise the judgment (…) In such a case, the claimant in England could proceed with the arbitration 
in England so as to obtain a judgment in England; if that were inconsistent with the judgment obtained 
in the member state then that would provide an answer on its own (see Art.34(3) [of former Brussels I 
Regulation])”136 
58. Following this dictum137, in African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd, Beatson assumed 
that the judgment entered in terms of the award constituted a judgment within the meaning of former 
Article 34 of Brussels I - current Art.45(1)(c) of Brussels I Bis regulation -. In this case, the defendant 
argued that in the light of Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch138 the judgment entered in terms 
of the award did not constitute a judgment within the meaning of the regulation because it is a simply 
mechanism for summary enforcement which does not involve any consideration by the Court of the 
issues between the parties.139 The Court dismissed this submission distinguishing Solo Kleinmotoren 
GmbH on the ground that it was a case about a court-approved settlement which, according to the own 
ruling of the European Court of Justice, was essentially contractual140, whilst the outcome of arbitration 
and the contents of the award are not consensual.141 
59. It could be argued that the judgment required by Article 45(1)(c) is a Regulation Judgment, 
or in other words, a court decision which satisfy the definition of Art.2(a) and which falls within the 
scope of the Regulation. However, this construction of Article 45(1)(c) must be dismissed for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
a)   Firstly, it is unsound with the literal wording of the provision – the provision reads as follows: 
“If the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the Mem-
134  r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 287. The same conclusion is held by other authors: “The scope of 
Art. 45 is broader than that of Arts. 29 to 32 because the decision in conflict with the judgment whose recognition is sought, may 
fall outside the scope of the Regulation, either because it was rendered in a third state – for Art. 45(1)(d) – or because it covers 
subjects excluded from the material scope of the Regulation – for Art.45(1)(c) and (d).” (P. Mankowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1… 
op. cit. p. 919).
135  National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion Sa (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397.
136  ibidem [63].
137  African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei KG [2011] EWHC 2542 (Comm) 
[28(b)].
138  “It follows from the foregoing that in order to be a “judgment” for the purposes of the Convention, the decision must 
emanate from a judicial body of a Contracting State deciding on its own authority on the issue between the parties” (Solo Klein-
motoren GmbH v Emilio Boch [1994] C-414/92 [17]).
139  African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei KG [2011] EWHC 2542 (Comm) [9].
140  Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch [1994] C-414/92 [18].
141  African Fertilizers and Chemicals NIG Ltd v BD Shipsnavo GmbH & Co Reederei KG [2011] EWHC 2542 (Comm) [28(a)].
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ber State addressed” (emphasis added) –. Had the lawmaker intended to restrict Art.45(1)(c) to 
Regulation Judgments, it would have expressly established this condition142.
b)   Secondly, in the Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH case, the Court held that the definition of “judg-
ment” established in Article 2(a) of the Regulation applies to all the provisions in which that 
term is used143 and, as it was referred above, in order to be considered a judgment, this defi-
nition does not require the decision of the court to be on a matter covered by the Regulation. 
Therefore, the fact that only the judgments on civil and commercial matters not excluded 
by Art.1(2) are to benefit from the recognition and enforcement which the Regulation pro-
vides144 does not mean that others judicial decisions are not deemed as judgments as well.
c)   Thirdly, since the grounds to refuse the recognition and enforcement of a judgment con-
stitutes obstacles to the free movement of judgments, they must be interpreted strictly145. 
Certain manipulation of the provisions’ verbatim might be admissible provided that the ma-
nipulation is sound with the Regulation; however, establishing that under Art.45(1)(c) “a 
judgment” is a decision which not only must meet the requirements of Art.2(a), but also fall 
within the scope of the Regulation, it is not an acceptable manipulation but the creation of an 
autonomous definition of the term “judgment” for the purposes only of Art.45(1)(c).
60. Consequently, regarding the position of the complying party to an English arbitration clause, 
the decisions adopted by English courts pursuant to section 66 could have two effects: firstly, under Ar-
ticle 45(1)(c) of Brussels I Bis, they would entitle the party to resist in England the enforcement of any 
inconsistent judgment rendered later in another member state146; but also, they could have a preclusive 
effect147 in the jurisdiction where the party in breach commenced the judicial proceedings provided that 
such jurisdiction “recognises any principle similar to English principle of issue estoppel”148.
61. Similarly, since Article 45(1)(d) of Brussels I Bis does not require the irreconcilable judg-
ment given in another Member state to be on a matter covered by the Regulation, it can be concluded 
that the decisions adopted by English Courts, albeit not recognisable in any other member state under 
the Regulation149, could instead be used to resist the enforcement of the Regulation Judgment in other 
142  “[This] must have been intentional, as there could be many non-Regulation judgments given by the courts in one country 
(e.g. in relation to insolvency proceedings, which are excluded by Art. 1.2(b)) that might be inconsistent in some material way 
with a latter incoming judgment between the same parties.” [r.M Merkin & L. FLannery, Arbitration Act… op. cit. p. 287]
143  Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch [1994] C-414/92 [15] and [20].
144  P. Mankowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1… op. cit. p. 88.
145  Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch [1994] C-414/92 [20]. In this sense, “it must be emphasized that [the excep-
tions contained in Art.45(1) of Brussels I Bis] are interpreted strictly and, even when applicable, are construed narrowly.” [J. 
FitChen, ‘Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments under the New Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012)’ 
(2015) 26 International Company and Commercial Law Review 145].
146  “El art.45.1.c) RB I-bis se refiere a una “resolución dictada entre las mismas partes en el estado miembro requerido”, 
por lo que una resolución dictada en estado miembro por la que se otorga validez y eficacia a un laudo arbitral es una “resolu-
ción (art. 2.a RB I-bis) que puede detener el reconocimiento de una resolución dictada en otro estado miembro.” (a.L. CaLvo 
CaravaCa, J. CarrasCosa GonzáLez & C. CaaMiña DoMinGuez, Litigación Internacional… op. cit. p. 577). Similarly, “if the 
award is, however, incorporated into a national judgment of the requested state, Art.45(1)(c) could apply and lead to refusing 
the enforcement of the judgment rendered in another member state.” (P. Mankowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1… op. cit. p. 922).
147  Sovarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] EWHC 1661 (Comm) [57].
148  Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 
[29]. In accordance with DiPLoCk “In English Law when a plaintiff who, basing his claims on a particular set of facts, has al-
ready sued the defendant to final judgment in a foreign Court of competent jurisdiction and lost, then seeks to enforce a cause 
of action in an English Court against the same defendant based on the same set of facts, the defendant’s remedy against such 
double jeopardy is provided by the doctrine of issue estoppel.” (The Sennar (No2) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 521 523). Hence, as 
established by branDon oF oakbrook: “In order to create an estoppel of that kind, 3 requirements have to satisfied. The first 
requirement is that the judgment in that earlier action on as creating an estoppel must be (a) of a Court of competent jurisdiction, 
(b) final and conclusive and (c) on the merits. The second requirement is that the parties (or privies) in the earlier action relied 
on as creating an estoppel and those in the later action in which that estoppel is raised as a bar, must be the same. The third 
requirement is that the issue in the later action, in which the estoppel is raised as a bar, must be the same issue as the decided 
by the judgment in the earlier action”. [ibidem p. 526].
149  Sovarex SA v Romero Alvarez SA [2011] EWHC 1661 (Comm) [57].
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European jurisdictions different from the one where it was rendered. However, in this scenario, the bar 
is set higher and the decisions adopted by English Courts pursuant to section 66 would only be capable 
of being used as shields where the following requirements are satisfied:
a)   They must have the same parties as the Regulation Judgment sought to be recognised and 
enforced.
b)   They must have the same cause of actions as the Regulation Judgment sought to be recog-
nised and enforced.
c)   And finally, the English judgments must fulfil the conditions for their recognition established 
on the legislation of the member state addressed. Therefore, in the examined scenario, the 
effectivity as a shield of the English judgment entered in terms of the declaratory award is 
uncertain since it is to depend upon a non-homogenous and commonly adopted set of rules: 
the national legislation on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
62. Alternatively, it has also been argued that the interested party could shield himself, not behind 
the ground contained in Art.45(1)(c), but behind the public policy exception established in Art.45(1)(a) 
of the Regulation. For example, in The Wadi Sudr case, it was argued that the enforcement of a judgment 
delivered by a Spanish Court in contravention of a valid arbitration agreement was contrary to English 
public policy. Moore-Bick dismissed this submission holding that the public policy exception cannot be 
“invoked on the ground that the foreign court has reached a decision which the court of the recognising 
or enforcing state thinks is wrong”150, on the other hand, its application is restricted to a “very narrow 
class of cases”151 where recognition “would be inconsistent with a fundamental principle of the legal 
order of the enforcing member state”152. Therefore, he concluded that “it cannot be said that the fail-
ure on the part of the Spanish court in good faith to give effect in this case to an arbitration agreement 
imperfectly spelt out in the bill of lading (but in the eyes of English Law sufficiently incorporated by 
reference) would involve a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the 
United Kingdom or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.”153
63. Finally, another possible solution to our problem could be found in the New York Conven-
tion 1958. Brussels I Bis in the third paragraph of Recital 12 recognises that the Convention is to take 
precedence over the Regulation154 and Article 73(2) provides that the regulation “shall not affect the 
application of the 1958 New York Convention.” Though the consequences of this precedence are un-
clear, it has been suggested that in case of contradiction between a conventional award and a regulation 
judgment, the former should be enforced instead of the latter155. In my opinion, some qualifications must 
be made to this view:
150  National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion Sa (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397 [125] and [130].
151  ibidem [131].
152  ibidem [130]. In the words of the European Court of Justice: “Recourse to the public policy clause (…) can be envis-
aged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another contracting state would be at variance to an 
unacceptable degree with the legal order of the state in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental 
principle. (…) the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal 
order of the state in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.” (Dieter 
Krombach v André Bamberski [2000] ECJ 1-1935 C-7/98 [37]).
153  National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion Sa (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397 [131].
154  “An essential matter is that [Brussels I Bis] expressly voices the primacy of the New York Convention. The Recital (12 
para.3) states that the New York Convention "takes precedence over this Regulation", and according to art.73(2) this Regulation 
shall not affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention". (t. Linna, ‘The Protection of Arbitration Agreements and 
the Brussels I Regulation’ [2016] 19 International Arbitration Law Review 70, 72).
155  “[The Brussels I Bis Regulation] allows parallel proceedings, but in the end, the arbitral award would be stronger 
because of the priority of the NYC.” (ibidem). Similarly, “Even if this part of the Recital is particularly unclear, it apparently 
implies that if the award contradicts the judgment rendered in another member state, and when both should be enforced (the 
judgment under Brussels I Bis and the award under the New York Convention) priority should be given to the award.” (P. Man-
kowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1… op. cit. p. 923).
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a)   Were this precedence existent, it would not be applicable to the English declaratory award 
registered in England under section 66 because, for the purposes of the act, that award is 
domestic and the New York Convention deals with the enforcement of awards “made, in pur-
suance of an arbitration agreement, in the territory of a state (other than the United Kingdom) 
which is a party to the New York Convention”156.
b)   After proclaiming the general duty of the Court to refer to arbitration those disputes in re-
spect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement, the Convention establishes 
that the seized court will be exempted of this duty where it “finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”157. Since the determination of 
the agreement’s nullity, inoperability or incapability to be performed is a necessary precedent 
to the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the substance matter of the dispute, it is obvious that 
neither the Court has breached its Conventional duty, nor the award will prevail over the 
judgment within the Court’s jurisdiction.
c)   Only in a country other than the United Kingdom and the country where the Regulation 
Judgment has been rendered, this approach could be effective because, according to the 
Convention, the courts of the contracting state are compelled to recognize arbitral awards 
as binding and enforce them158. Nevertheless, in this situation, it is very doubtful that the 
Court will opt for honouring a declaratory award instead of the Judgment on the merits from 
a European peer who has determined that, due to the nullity, inoperability or incapability to 
be performed of the arbitration agreement, such award ought not to exist. On the other hand, 
it is probable that an award on the merits could take precedence over the Regulation Judg-
ment not only due to the precedence of the Convention over the Regulation but also, as some 
German scholars assert, via an analogical application of Art.41(1)(d)159. In this scenario, the 
chances of success would be higher where the Regulation Judgement has not been rendered 
either in the country in which the award was made, or in the country under the law of which 
the award was made, since, for the purposes of the Convention, the Courts of these two fora 
are the only ones capable to produce a decision regarding the nullity or suspension of the 
award with binding consequences on the rest of contracting states160.
IV. Conclusions
64. The impossibility to grant anti-suit injunctions in case of breach of an English arbitration 
agreement by commencing judicial before the courts of a member state of the European Union other than 
the United Kingdom on civil and commercial matters covered by Brussels I Bis Regulation leaves the 
complying party in a weak situation. Provided that the party in breach has decided to bring in the dispute 
before the Courts of a country whose legal system is to regard the arbitration clause as null and void, in-
operative or incapable of being performed, the complying party can take for granted that a claim for a stay 
of the proceedings is to be refused and a judgment on the substance matter is to be rendered. We call this 
decision “Regulation Judgment” because, in accordance with Paragraph 3 of Recital 12 of Brussels I Bis 
Regulation, it will be able to take advantage of the system of recognition and enforcement provided in the 
European Regulation. The question which this project has tried to answer is: can the complying party ben-
efit from the English arbitration clause to obtain an award ruling on the validity of the agreement which can 
subsequently be converted in a judgment under the summary procedures of section 66 and which would 
entitle him to resist the later recognition and enforcement of the inconsistent Regulation Judgment?
156  s.100(1) AA96. The United Kingdom used the option established in Art.I(3) NYC to, on the basis of reciprocity, restrict 
the application of the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contract-
ing State. 
157  Article II(3) NYC.
158  Article III NYC.
159  P. Mankowski & M. uLriCh, Volume 1… op. cit. p. 921.
160  Article V(1)(e) NYC.
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65. In order to answer this question, it has been firstly examined the regulation established in 
section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The enforcement under this section is restricted to those awards 
made pursuant to an arbitration agreement which satisfies the broad definition contained in the Act. 
Though initially controversial, the use of this provision to enforce declaratory awards is admitted by 
English Courts provided that the claimant can obtain any positive benefit from its enforcement, such as 
establishing an issue estoppel161.
66. The main problem is whether the judgment entered in terms of the declaratory award can 
be used as a shield against the recognition and enforcement of the Regulation Judgment. Taking into 
account that Articles 45(1)(c) and (d) do not require the inconsistent judgment to be on matters covered 
by the European Regulation, the decisions adopted by English Courts pursuant to section 66 of the Act 
would entitle the complying party to resist the enforcement of the Regulation Judgment either in the 
United Kingdom (under Article 45(1)(c)) or, provided that they satisfy the requirements established in 
Article 45(1)(d), in any other European jurisdiction other than the one which has rendered the “Regula-
tion Judgment”.
67. Taking into account the conditions established by Article 45(1)(d) - especially the recognis-
ability under the legislation on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments of the member state 
addressed –, it can be held that the success of the examined defensive strategy is more certain where the 
“Regulation Judgment” is sought to be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom. Consequently, 
that strategy would be only recommendable where the complying party has most of its assets within the 
jurisdiction of English Courts.
68. Having discarded the use of the public policy defence established in Art.45(1)(a) of Brussels 
I Bis Regulation, the complying party would also be able to resist the enforcement of the “Regulation 
Judgment” if the New York Convention 1958 prevails over the Regulation in case of conflict between 
a Conventional Award and a Regulation Judgment. However, the effects of this precedence is uncertain 
and it would only apply to member states other than the United Kingdom (because for the purposes of 
this country the award would be domestic and it would not be enforceable under the Convention) and the 
country where the Regulation Judgment has been rendered (because for this jurisdiction the award should 
not exist since the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed).
69. Finally, it must be kept in mind the consequences of Brexit. If the United Kingdom finally 
leaves the European Union, the doctrine of the European Courts and the European legislation will no 
longer apply. Consequently, against the Torpedo Action examined in these lines, British Courts will be 
able to protect the arbitration agreement not only through anti-suit injunction as it occurs nowadays 
with non-EU proceedings162, but also, they will be able to refuse the recognition and enforcement of 
the “Regulation Judgment” on the ground that its recognition or enforcement is contrary to the British 
public policy. As Moore-Brick said “I do not think that it would be contrary to public policy to recognise 
the Judgment even if an English Court would have held that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute 
to arbitration. Different consideration might arise if the Judgment had been obtained through conscious 
wrongdoing, for example by pursuing proceedings in defiance of an injunction”163 (emphasis added).
161  C. aMbrose, h. suMPtion & k. MaxweLL, London Maritime… op. cit. para 23.11.
162  Shashoua & Ors v Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm).
163  National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion Sa (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397 [125].
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